

SECRET

JZX-5519

28 November 1945

TO: SAINT AMZON
FROM: SAINT BB8 by CB9
SUBJECT: ZIMMER Guido *sf/ed/ld*
REFERENCE: Your X-3377

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MAY 4 1963

DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. In 1940 Subject worked under Embassy cover in Rome. The circumstances under which he left Italy are given in detail in our JRX-810, interrogation of Otto ~~LECHNER~~, from which the following is extracted:

X "ALEKSEIEFF (an Abt VI agent in Rome specializing in working against U.S. circles) reported this (information regarding a presumed attempt against Mussolini's life) to ZIMMER who forwarded this information to ~~BISMARCK~~ who in turn gave it to the Italian police. By transmitting this information in this way ZIMMER not only blew his source, but also made it clear to the Italian police that he himself was working an intelligence network in Rome contrary to the Rome-Berlin pact. The information should have been transmitted to RSHA Hqs. Because of this slip, ZIMMER was recalled to Berlin, and it was only due to the intervention of an influential uncle of his that he was not sacked completely."

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2. ~~LECHNER~~, possibly conditioned by this episode, considered Subject as an incompetent intelligence officer. In our opinion the episode is not without interest in appraising Subject's capabilities.

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3. In any event Subject returned to Italy as Leiter, Abt VI, Aussenkdo Milan, in February 1944 according to SAUFF (CSMIC/SC/15 AG/3D 11 p. 4).

4. Regarding Subject's operations in Milan we are attaching for your information copies of transcriptions of three notebooks of Subject's official correspondence during his time as Leiter, Abt VI, Milan. The notebooks were seized by SCI Unit Z Milan during the course of their attempts to apprehend Subject. The transcription of the fourth notebook is presently in progress. We regret our inability to provide an English translation, thus far we have completed the translation only of Attachment B, translation of the rest is in progress, however, and it is planned to issue a full translated text of the four notebooks, which are of great operational importance, here, in due course.

5. The attachments we feel certain will enable you to estimate Subject's past activities far better than any other source known here. Attention is called especially to Subject's memos to SCHELLENBERG and his reports on his contacts with PARILLI. *copy*

6. Apropos of Baron PARILLI, we suggest that SAINT Berne be sounded inasmuch as he is still enjoying the benefits of neutral protection, as far as is known here.

7. The attitude of this Unit regarding PARILLI from the moment he was signalled as a German collaborator and agent by OSS SI field teams, has been that at the minimum he must provide a full and detailed account of the contacts he had long before the armistice negotiations with Major ENGELS of Aussenkdo Genoa and with the leader of AKO MILAN. No interrogation of GIS personnel received or conducted in this Theatre has indicated other than that PARILLI was a double agent working for the GIS. Several of Subject's memos, attached, state this both explicitly and implicitly.

8. Under the circumstances it is to be expected that both PARILLI and Subject will cite bona fide cases in which they "aided" Partisans or persons in contact with the Allied I.S. On this point, it should be noted however that neither Subject nor PARILLI did anything to save Prof. ZICCARDI & ZUCCA, head of the important OSS ZUCCA mission, when the latter was picked up by Abt IV, AKO Milan in the fall of 1944. ZICCARDI

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at the time he was arrested, had Subject's photograph on his person. The photograph had been given to ZICCARDI by PARRILI so that a false identity card could be made for Subject under some other name.

9. In line with these views, it is felt here that the importance of the role assigned to Subject and PARRILI is an unfortunate exaggeration. Attention is called specifically in this regard to the two articles which appeared in the Saturday Evening Post on 22 and 29 September, respectively.

10. Regarding Subject's connections with MINETTI we attach (Attachment D) a report by SCI Unit Z Milan which touches on this point as well as other matters of interest regarding his stay in Milan.

11. Summing up:

- (a) Subject's effective contribution to Italian resistance activities was negligible and insofar as they existed were predicated upon the fact that as an Abt VI officer he looked at things in a slightly more subtle way than Abt IV.
- (b) The real measure of his work as an Abt VI officer is to be found by reference to the attachments which certainly indicate that he did not lie down on the job.
- (c) Regarding Subject's ability and potentialities, LECHNER's opinion, cited above, para 2, should not be taken lightly. Bearing on Subject's competence, it should be noted that the agent GIORGIO referred to repeatedly in Subject's correspondence is in fact identical with Capt. CARENZI, a bona fide CNL penetration agent who secured from Subject much of the material published in the monthly CNL CE Bulletins. (CARENZI's interrogation report is in progress here, and will be forwarded, soonest.)

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12. By way of conclusion we quote the following from our memo JZX-4039 of 11 September 1945 to SAINT Washington:

"We, for our part, see no particular reason why ZIMMER should be treated any differently from General WOLFF, who as you know was placed at the disposition of CSDIC here and thoroughly exploited before being moved to Nuremberg for the War Crimes trials. ZIMMER, in our estimation, should be given at least a complete tactical interrogation on Abt VI activities in the Milan area, details of which, from all available evidence, he knows thoroughly."

The measure of Subject's good faith will be found by comparing whatever he has told you without prompting with the details given above and in the attachments on his activities in Rome and Milan since 1940.

Attachments 4.

cc: SC1/Z Milan
Washington
London
Files